Formalism in the Tax Law
DavidA. Weisbacht
The tax law is the paradigmatic system of rules. Over thirteen large black volumes filled with tax rules sit on my shelf. Yet
over the last several years, the purely rule-oriented approach to
the tax law has begun to be perceived as a failure. The reason is
that taxpayers have been able to manipulate the rules endlessly
to produce results clearly not intended by the drafters. Manipulation of this sort is inefficient, loses revenue, and demoralizes others.
To respond, lawmakers and regulators have shifted the tax
system toward standards, primarily by adopting what are known
as "anti-abuse rules." A typical anti-abuse rule allows the govermnent (and only the government) to override the literal words
of a statute or regulation. Instead, the government may require a
"reasonable" tax result if the taxpayer enters into or structures a
transaction with a principal purpose of reducing tax liabilities in
a manner contrary to the purposes of the statute or regulation,
even if the transaction otherwise literally complies with the
rules.'
t Associate Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank Beth Garrett,
Saul Levmore, Randy Picker, and Julie Roin for comments and Nate Carden for research
assistance.
See Treas Reg § 1.701-2 (the partnership anti-abuse rule), Treas Reg § 1.1275-2(g)
(the original issue discount ("OID) anti-abuse rule), and Treas Reg § 1.1502-13(h) (the intercompany transaction anti-abuse rule) for examples of typical anti-abuse rules. The
most important operative provision of the partnership anti-abuse rule is "if a partnership
is formed or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which is to
reduce substantially the present value of the partner's aggregate federal tax liability in a
manner that is inconsistent with the intent of subchapter X, the Commissioner can recast
the transaction." Treas Reg § 1.701-2. Similarly, the OED anti-abuse rule provides in relevant part, "[I]f a principal purpose in structuring a debt instrument or engaging in a
transaction is to achieve a result that is unreasonable in light of the purposes of section
163(e), sections 1271 through 1275, or any related section of the Code, the Commissioner
can apply or depart from the regulations under the applicable sections as necessary or appropriate to achieve a reasonable result." Treas Reg § L1275-2(gXl). Other anti-abuse
rules can be found throughout the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations. For
a small sample, see IRC § 1031(f)(4) (1994) (stating that section 1031 (granting nonrecognition on exchanges of like kind property) "shall not apply to any exchange which is part of
a transaction (or series of transactions) structured to avoid the purposes of [subsection
1031(f)]"); IRC § 269 (1994) (prohibiting corporate acquisitions with a purpose of avoiding
tax); IRC § 7701(f) (1994) (permitting the IRS to issue regulations to prevent avoidance of
those provisions of the Code dealing with the linking of borrowing to investment or di-
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A common reaction to anti-abuse rules is horror. Anti-abuse
rules seem to eliminate certainty and reliability in the tax law.
They replace reliance on the rules with a one-way law favoring
the government, administered at the discretion of government
agents, and dependent upon the taxpayer's purposes or thoughts
rather than his actions. After all, how can people fill out their tax
returns unless the law is clear?
The tax law has, however, long included principles that have
effects similar to anti-abuse rules, such as substance over form,
the step transaction doctrine, and the sham transaction doctrine.2
The only real difference between these common law tax doctrines
and anti-abuse rules (other than the detailed specifics of their
applicability) is that, instead of being developed by the courts,
anti-abuse rules are incorporated directly into the regulation or
statute, thereby eliminating the statutory (or regulatory) interpretation question. With anti-abuse rules, we must face directly
whether the approach is desirable.'
This Article addresses the question of whether (or when)
anti-abuse rules are desirable. The answer was suggested thirty
years ago by Stanley Surrey: "It is clear that [various antiavoidance provisions in the law at that timel save the tax system
from the far greater proliferation of detail that would be necessary if the tax avoider could succeed merely by bringing his
scheme within the literal language of substantive provisions written to govern the everyday world." That is, the most important
feature of anti-abuse rules is their substitution of standards for
rules. We want the advantage of rules (Surrey's substantive provisions), but in the tax law, rules alone would have to be unduly
complex to prevent avoidance. Anti-abuse rules allow the tax sys-

minishing risks through the use of related persons); IRC § 7701(1) (permitting the IRS to
issue "regulations recharacterizing any multiple-party financing transaction as a transaction directly among any 2 or more of such parties where the [IRS] determines that such
recharacterization is appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax); Treas Reg
§ 1.246-5(c) (anti-abuse provision regarding reduction of "holding period of stock for purposes of the dividends received deduction"); Trees Reg § 1.446-3(i) (anti-abuse provision
regarding use of notional principal contracts); Treas Reg § 1.1502-32(e) ("anti-avoidance"
rule for "adjusting the basis of the stock of a subsidiary [ ] owned by another member").
' For a description of these rules, see Alan Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 Mich L Rev 733
(1978) (criticizing anti-abuse rules and arguing against inquiry into a taxpayer's purpose).
Much of the literature on court generated anti-abuse principles focuses on questions
of statutory interpretation. See, for example, Joseph Isenbergh, Musing on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U Chi L Rev 859 (1982) (book review).
Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the
Management of Tax Detail, 34 L & Contemp Probs 673, 707 n 31 (1969) (considering merits of a general anti-avoidance statutory provision).
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tern to have the advantages of reasonably simple rules without
the disadvantages.
Surrey's claim is that standards allow the law to be more
simple than rules do. The recent rules/standards scholarship does
not make this connection. Most recent literature is not explicit
about the connection between rules/standards and complexity,
but much scholarship seems to treat rules as simpler than standards rather than the other way around.' A notable exception is
Louis Kaplow's article on rules and standards, which is explicit
about the matter but treats the level of complexity as independent of the rules/standards question.' I argue below that Surrey's
intuition is correct. There is a connection between rules/standards and complexity, at least in the context of the tax law. In
particular, standards prevent the tax law from being too complex.
Two other important features of anti-abuse rules also deserve scrutiny. First, they are one-way. They allow only the government to disregard the rules; taxpayers are bound.' Second,
they rely on the taxpayer's state of mind. Both these elements are
controversial; the tax law could use standards without these features. These features also will be addressed below.
I take an economic approach in this Article, in that the consequences of the various approaches matter. Thus, anti-abuse
rules are appropriate, compared to the alternatives, if they
maximize welfare within the policymaker's constraints. This approach leaves aside rights-based approaches and, in particular,
claims that taxpayers have an entitlement to rely on the literal
words of the statute.' In addition, this Article leaves aside issues
of whether the Treasury Department has authority to issue
regulatory anti-abuse rules that interpret statutes. Much of the
reaction to anti-abuse rules has focused on authority, but if anti' See, for example, Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257, 265 (1974) (arguing that rules make prediction of
outcomes easier and reduce costs of the legal process); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 1687-88 (1976) (characterizing
rules as determinate and standards as requiring discovery and assessment of details);
Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol 645, 646-47 (1991)
(arguing that under "presumptive positivism," rule-based decisionmaking need not preclude particularistic judgments).
' Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557,
568-88 (1992) (treating a rule and a standard that lead to identical outcomes in all cases
as equally complex).
' Thus, if a taxpayer accidentally steps slightly to one side of a line, the taxpayer is
generally stuck with the literal result provided by the statute or regulation (although in
these circumstances courts often stretch to read the statute in the taxpayer's favor).
' Alan Gunn takes such an approach. See Gunn, 76 Mich L Rev at 735-37 (cited in
note 2) (describing "the legal right" to avoid a tax). He derives such an entitlement from
the case law. The case law, as far as I can tell, made the entitlement out of whole cloth.
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abuse rules are desirable, authority questions merely determine
which branch of government should promulgate them. These may
well be difficult questions, involving constitutional issues and issues of institutional capacity, but they are secondary to the direct
analysis of desirability.
Section I of the Article considers how rules and standards interact with the content of the law. Sections II and II consider,
respectively, whether anti-abuse rules should be one-way and
whether they should rely on purpose. Section IV identifies factors
that should be considered in determining whether particular
anti-abuse rules are appropriate and provides some additional
remarks.
I.

COMPLEX RULES, SIMPLE STANDARDS

To frame the issues raised by complex tax rules and tax
avoidance, consider so-called "mixing bowl" transactions. Under
current law, a partnership is not taxed as a separate entity. Instead, partners are taxed on the income of the partnership. To
this end, the partnership tax rules attempt to make the partnership transparent for tax purposes. Thus, contributions to and distributions from partnerships are generally tax free
These simple rules have a huge hole. Suppose taxpayers A
and B contribute their own properties to a partnership and, immediately thereafter, they each receive a distribution of the
other's property. Under the partnership rules, the contribution
and the distribution are both tax free. A direct exchange of the
properties, however, would have been taxable under the realization rule. A and B avoided the realization rule by using a partnership to do indirectly what would have been a realization event
had it been done directly. 10 Most people immediately respond that
See IRC § 721 (1994) (contributions) and IRC § 731 (1994) (distributions).
"Here is another simple example, described in Joseph Bankman, The New Market for
Corporate Tax Shelters, 53 Tax L Rev (forthcoming 1999). Suppose a profitable domestic
corporation would like to generate a tax loss to use against its profits. The strategy is to
generate offsetting gain and loss and have the gain recognized by a nontaxable entity,
such as an offshore corporation, and the loss recognized by the domestic corporation. This
can be accomplished as follows. A foreign party, not subject to US tax, enters into a straddie on a currency in a country in which it does not conduct business. For example, a foreign party, domiciled and conducting business in Nation A, might enter into offsetting
long and short options in the currency of Nation B. In time, one option will increase in
value and one will decrease in value. Assume, for example, that each option was purchased for an amount equal to $50 million (in US dollars) and that the gain position goes
up in value to $90 million and the loss position falls in value to $10 million. The foreign
party sells the gain position and contributes the loss position, with a basis of $50 million
and fair market value of $10 million, to an existing subsidiary ("Sub") of the domestic corporation ("Parent"). In return, the foreign party receives nonvoting preferred stock with a
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the partnership rules can't mean that. If they did, the realization
rule would be meaningless, as it could be avoided at will.
The appropriate solution to this problem is not obvious. One
possible response is to interpret the statute to prevent this obvious avoidance or, similarly, to pass a new law imposing such a
standard. The exact content of the law would be uncertain, although, for many, if not most, transactions the law's application
would be straightforward. Another possible solution would be to
amend the partnership rules to describe exactly which transactions will be treated as contributions and distributions and which
will not. Our tax law takes the latter approach. We now have a
highly complex set of rules that distinguishes between partnership transactions and mixing bowl sales, with safe harbor periods, presumptions, exceptions, required risk allocations, allowable preferred returns, accommodation partner rules, and dozens
of examples."
The problem is a rules/standards problem. 2 The usual analysis assumes that rules are simple and standards are complex.
value of, say, $11 million. At the same time, Parent contributes an amount of cash to Sub
equal to 10 percent of the value of Sub. Parent and'Sub take the position that the transfers of Parent and the foreign party are governed by IRC § 351 (1994) and related provisions. Consequently, Sub takes a basis in the loss position equal to its basis in the hands
of the foreign party B ($50 million). Sub sells the position and takes a $40 million foreign
currency loss, which is ordinary rather than capital and, therefore, can be used against
operating income.
It is easy to see that, if this transaction were respected, it would reduce corporate taxable income to near zero, and there are dozens of similar types of transactions. It is, however, difficult to determine the size of the market for these transactions because most
transactions are not public. Bankman, who offers the most comprehensive survey of this
market, estimates that corporations save about $10 billion per year in taxes. Id. Forbes,in
a recent cover story on the market for these types of shelters, estimates the growth in the
industry by looking at the growth in Big Five accounting firm tax practices, which have
grown at 10 percent a year-more than twice the pace of their audit practices; Forbes
speculates that the growth is attributable to the growth in the market for tax shelters.
Janet Novack and Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, Forbes 198, 206
(Dee 14, 1998).
" See IRC § 704 (c)(1)(B) (1994) and Treas Reg § 1.704.4 (treating certain distributions
of contributed property as sales by partner); IRC § 707(aX2XB) (1994) and Treas Reg
§ 1.707-4, -5 (treating certain transfers to and from a partnership as sales if "properly
characterized" as sales); IRC § 737 (1994) and Treas Reg § 1.737-1, -5 (calculating gain
from a distribution of property to the contributing partner). Once one has the central idea
of disguised sales, the imagination runs wild. For example, the properties need not be distributed. Instead, income, deductions, gain, and loss from the property that is to be sold
can be allocated to the noncontributing partner. If cash is to be exchanged for property,
the contributing cash can be invested in safe securities and the selling partner can receive
a preferred return on the safe securities. The rules end up being quite intricate to cover all
the various possibilities.
" There are other problems presented by this example. In particular, determining the
appropriate substance of the law (for example, which transactions should be treated as
sales and which should be treated as partnership transactions), regardless of whether
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Rules are over and underinclusive relative to underlying norms
but, because they are simple, rules are certain, easy to apply, and
uniform. Standards better conform to the purpose underlying the
law, but they are more uncertain and apply less uniformly."
The mixing bowl example shows that contrary to the usual
assumption, rules are often highly complex. I will argue below
that this is typical-rather than being less complex than standards, rules must systematically be more complex than standards. The first step in the analysis was made in an important
article by Louis Kaplow where he argues that rules are not necessarily less complex than standards. Contrary to the conclusions
here, however, Kaplow argues that there is no connection between complexity and the use of rules or standards. This Section
begins by describing Kaplow's approach and then shows how
complexity and the use of rules or standards are connected.
A. Kaplow's Approach: Choosing Rules or Standards While
Holding Complexity Constant
Kaplow argues that as a positive matter, the assumption
that rules are simple and standards are complex is incorrect.14
Rules can be complex and highly tailored to match underlying
purposes while standards are often simple. This is the case with
the tax law's treatment of mixing bowl transactions. The rules
are highly complex, drafted by experts in the type of transactions
at issue and reviewed and commented on by hundreds of practitioners who engage in these transactions on a daily basis. While
we do not know what the standard for mixing bowl transactions
would have been had the tax law adopted one, it is difficult to believe that a judge or jury could make similarly nuanced distinctions or have similar knowledge of the range of transactions or
the impact of their decisions. Kaplow argues that, because there
is no necessary correlation between whether a law is promulgated
as a rule or a standard and the actual content of the law, we
should hold constant the law's content, including the level of
complexity, in determining whether rules or standards are appropriate. 5
done through a rule or a standard, is a serious and difficult problem. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,Doctrine,and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L J (forthcoming
Sept 1999), for an analysis of this type of problem.
" See Ehrlich and Posner, 3 J Legal Stud at 265 (cited in note 5); Kennedy, 89 Harv L
Rev at 1687-88 (cited in note 5); Schauer, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 727 (cited in note 5);
Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 565 n 13 (cited in note 6).
'4 Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 593-96 (cited in note 6).
"Id at 568-88.
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Under Kaplow's approach, the only difference between rules
and standards is whether the content of the law is determined before individuals act. If we use rules, the content of the law is determined prior to action; if we use standards, the exact content of
the law is determined after action. We can assume in both cases
that the content ultimately turns out to be the same. In other
words, rules and standards differ in that they merely affect the
level of uncertainty about the law that individuals face when they
act (as well as promulgation and enforcement costs).
One could conclude under these assumptions that the mixing
bowl problem should be resolved through rules. Under Kaplow's
analysis, the more frequent the activity, the more likely rules
should be used to govern it. 6 A simplified version of Kaplow's argument is that rules have higher promulgation costs because the
detailed content of the law must be determined at the time of
promulgation, while standards have higher application and enforcement costs because content is determined at the time of application and enforcement.' If the law must be applied frequently, a rule will dominate because the one-time promulgation
costs of a rule will likely be less than the frequent enforcement
costs of a standard. For example, there are millions (even hundreds of millions) of partnership contributions and distributions
each year. It is surely worthwhile to decide ex ante which ones
are sales and which ones are not. More generally, given the vast
number of transactions governed by the tax law, there would be
virtually no case for which the ex ante promulgation costs would
exceed the ex post application costs; therefore the tax law should
be promulgated almost entirely through rules. This view is common in the tax bar, where lawyers have argued in the context of
anti-abuse rules that rather than use vague standards we should
"confront and solve" difficult tax law problems so that "taxpayers
might understand" the law. 9
Although I agree with Kaplow that the assumption that rules
are simple and standards are complex is wrong, I do not agree
that there is no necessary correlation between the content of law
and the moment at which the content is determined, at least with
8 Id at 577.
"Id.

This ignores institutional issues such as the ability of government agents to act opportunistically under rules and under standards. For example, standards in tax law might
give auditing agents greater opportunities to abuse their discretion, because under standards auditors have wider latitude, and audits are typically secret while rulemaking is
relatively public.
"' Ken Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency,Simplicity, Fairness,81 Tax
Notes 999, 1001 (Nov 23, 1998).
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respect to the tax law. There are two reasons. First, rules can less
afford to overlook uncommon transactions than can standards.
Rules must specify the treatment of a greater number of transactions than standards and, therefore, they are systematically more
complex than standards. Second, when we use rules, small
changes in transactional form often create large changes in tax
liability-rules often create discontinuities. Standards in the
same context do not involve similar discontinuities. A discontinuous law may have different behavioral consequences than a continuous law, and as a result, the optimal content of a rule may be
different than the optimal content of a standard. Because of these
two problems, we must make the rules/standards decision at the
same time as we make content decisions, rather than in separate,
sequential steps, as suggested by Kaplow.' We must maximize
along both boundaries at once. When we do so, standards become
relatively more desirable. These arguments are considered immediately below.
B. Optimal Complexity: Making the Uncommon Common
This Section argues that rules are systematically more complex than standards because rules can less afford to overlook uncommon transactions than can standards. Before giving this argument, it is worthwhile to specify more exactly the notion of
complexity used here. For purposes of this Article the more complex the law, the more accurately it distinguishes between different individuals or transactions. For example, progressive rates,
personal deductions, and exemptions based on family size allow
us to impose tax liabilities more consistent with notions of distributive justice than a simpler law. A more complex distinction
between sales and partnership transactions would more carefully
categorize various transactions. We can think of this type of como This reflects my reading of the thrust of Kaplow's article. His notion of a "rule
equivalent to a standard" separates the choice of content from the choice of rules or standards. Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 586-96 (cited in note 6). He notes that complexity and
choice of rules or standards raise "two separate issues." Id at 590. Elsewhere, however, he
notes that there may be "synergy" between complexity and rules/standards decisions. Id at
589 n 86, 595 n 101. In footnote 78, Kaplow acknowledges that we must look at both complexity and uncertainty at the same time. On page 618, Kaplow notes that the analysis for
"laws regarding form" may be different than for laws regulating behavior. Conceivably the
tax law falls into the form category, as it generally is not used to regulate behavior. The
text reflects my reading of the main point of his article, although there are sufficient
hedges in the footnotes that most problems with this position are at least noted although
not incorporated into the main theory. Which approach he endorses, however, is not important to the argument in the text that complexity and the ruleststandards decision cannot be separated.
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plexity as the number of lines or the degree to which the lines
match the underlying terrain in a topological map. Too few lines
or lines that are too straight mean that the map does not provide
an accurate picture of the underlying topology.2 Too many lines
means the map is incomprehensible.
The obvious benefit of complexity is that the law will be more
efficient (or more fair or more of whatever measuring stick one
wants to use) than a less complex law. For example, complex law
reduces under or overtaxation of particular activities relative to
the desired amount as compared to simple law. Thus, if the law is
too simple in distinguishing between sales and partnership
transactions, it will under and overtax various transactions, creating misallocations. We must weigh the benefits of complexity
against the compliance costs of complexity and balance the marginal costs and benefits.
In many contexts, there is no reason to think that rules or
standards should have different levels of this type of complexity.
In both cases, greater complexity better tailors the law to the underlying economics and creates greater compliance costs. This
leaves us to make the rules/standards decision separately from
the complexity decision; the tax law, therefore, would be promulgated mostly through rules because, as noted above, rules are appropriate when the law is applied frequently, as in the tax law.
But the tax law may be different from other areas of law in
an important sense. In most areas of law (for example, the tort or
safety regulations considered by Kaplow), analysis of the costs
and benefits of complexity suggests that laws should be drafted to
fit common circumstances. If the law fits only common circumstances, rare and unusual facts might be misregulated, but under
or overdeterrence in these cases is not costly because the transactions are unusual. That is, at some point, the cost of fitting the
law to rare circumstances exceeds the costs of complexity, so we
don't bother. More importantly, the uncommon transactions will
remain uncommon (absent changes in technology), so one may be
confident in the assessment of the costs and benefits. Discussing
rules and standards, Fred Schauer used as an example a candi21An alternative notion is that complexity is caused simply by bad drafting. There

may be systemic causes of bad drafting, including the failure of government drafters to internalize the costs of complexity and the existence of incentives for drafters to create complexity. This type of complexity has been studied in some detail, but the underlying political structures that cause it remain basically unchanged. See, for example, Boris I. Bittker,
Tax Reform and Tax Simplification,29 U Miami L Rev 1, 5-13 (1974). While complexity of
this sort is worth study (and potential remedies should be adopted, if possible), I would
like to leave this type of complexity aside and focus on the complexity needed to tailor the
law to individual circumstances.
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date for office who misses a filing deadline by three minutes; Lon
Fuller used as an example a statue of a truck placed in a park
where vehicles are prohibited.22 There will not be more missed
filing deadlines or statues of trucks in parks merely because the
rules are insufficiently complex. In an important sense, these
sorts of transactions are static.
The tax law cannot adopt this approach. Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become common as taxpayers discover how to take advantage of them. This is not true in all
cases in the tax law-there are places, such as the depreciation or
amortization rules, where simple tax rules have not created this
problem. But consider the mixing bowl example. Contributions
and immediate distributions from partnerships were not common
transactions when the partnership rules were drafted. The drafters clearly had in mind the normal business functioning of a
partnership. The rules were insufficiently complex because they
covered all contributions and distributions to partnerships, instead of a more carefully tailored set of transactions. Given time
and insufficient complexity, taxpayers discovered an uncommon
transaction that was mistaxed--contributions followed by immediate distributions. Uncommon transactions then became common (and even got a cute name, "mixing bowl" transactions).'
The difference between tax law and other laws in this respect
may be one of degree rather than kind. For example, underdeterred transactions will become more common in an insufficiently
complex tort regime. If one type of hazardous chemical is highly
regulated and a less used but similar hazardous compound is not,
users will switch to the unregulated compound. Dan Kahan notes
that this effect occurs in the regulation of drugs in the criminal
law.24 But in tax law the problem seems to be worse. One explanation might be the tax law's focus on form, which allows taxpayers to change the application of the law to particular transactions
without significantly changing their economics. Another might be
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509, 515 (1988) (describing the unreported case Hunter v Norman); Lon L. Fuller, Positivismand Fidelity to Law--A Reply to
ProfessorHart, 71 Harv L Rev 630, 663 (1958) (rebutting the claim by H.L-- Hart that a
.no vehicles in the park rule would be easy to apply without reference to the purpose of

the rule").
Similarly, the transactions described in note 10 (the offshore foreign currency straddles followed by contribution of one leg to a domestic corporation) were not common at the
time the rules were drafted, to say the least.
24 Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96
Mich L Rev 127, 138 (1997). Kahan uses as one example a criminal law listing prohibited
substances by chemical composition. In response, drug sellers can alter the composition
ever so slightly so that the drug produces the same effect on the users but is not on the
prohibited substance list.
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the culture of tax compliance, which seems to encourage manipulation.' Yet another explanation is that the tax law is not
special and the analysis given here applies more generally.
Whichever explanation is correct, the effect is common in the tax
26
law.
It is inefficient for uncommon transactions to become common merely because of a tax advantage. Efficiency in the tax law
is measured by whether the law raises revenue without creating
adverse incentives. Inaccuracies in the tax law lose on both
counts, creating adverse incentives and lowering tax revenues.'
One cannot mistax uncommon transactions (for example, by
having rules that are too simple) and not worry about it.
The solution in the mixing bowl context was to make the
rules more complex, so that they better reflected the underlying
norms.' They now carefully distinguish between partnership
transactions and mixing bowl sales. But rules are not good at
regulating infrequent transactions because their content must be
determined ex ante. If there are 1,000 possible rare transactions,
and only 10 actually will occur absent the opportunity to evade
taxes, rules must anticipate all 1,000 transactions and do so accurately.
Standards would have been less complex because they would
not have had to anticipate each and every situation that might
arise in the future. A standard needs to be given content only for
those sets of facts, the 10 of the 1,000, that actually occur. The
content of the law for the other 990 remains open, which means

This culture arguably stems from a long history of court decisions blessing tax
avoidance schemes. See, for example, cases cited in Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's
Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 Yale L J 440, 441 (1968) ("More perhaps
than any other single judge or commentator, Learned Hand was instrumental in the development of [judicial approval of tax avoidance]."). Perhaps the most famous statement to
this effect is in Helvering v Gregory, 69 F2d 809, 810 (2d Cir 1934) ("[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes."), affd, 293 US 465 (1935). Using a dangerous chemical that somehow managed to
escape regulation or altering an illegal drug to avoid prohibition would not be viewed with
similar heroism.
26 See Bankman, 53 Tax L Rev (forthcoming 1999) (cited in note 10), and Novack
and
Saunders, The Hustling, Forbes at 199 (cited in note) (noting that the corporate tax shelter "business is booming").
' The revenue losses may be enormous. As noted above, Bankman argues that the
losses are as high as $10 billion per year. See Bankman, 53 Tax L Rev (forthcoming 1999)
(cited in note 10).
" This is not to say that the regulations are purely rule-based. Like most laws, they
include some mix of rules and standards, but on a relative basis, they are very rule-like.
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that overall the law is less complex. In other words, because
when standards are used the content of the law is determined after taxpayers act, there will be fewer opportunities for taxpayers
to take advantage of imperfections in the law. This means that
the other 990 transactions, some of which would have occurred
under insufficiently complex rules, will not occur under a standard. If the law is promulgated as a standard, at a lower level of
complexity the uncommon will not become common. Therefore,
tax rules must be more complex than tax standards.
One may still conclude that the tax law should be promulgated as rules, albeit complex ones. After all, most tax laws still
apply to millions of transactions. Unfortunately, however, when
rules become highly complex, they tend to remain subject to the
"uncommon becoming common" problem because of "interaction"
costs. Interaction costs are the costs of ensuring that the various
provisions of the law work together-that they do not conflict or
have unintended gaps or loopholes. The more complex tax law
gets, the greater the number of interactions among the rules and
the more complex the law must be. The number of interactions is
approximately proportional to the square of the number of rules,'
and as complexity increases, interaction costs quickly become intolerable. If unusual transactions stay unusual, odd interactions
between rules can be ignored. But in the tax context the law must
anticipate all of the interactions, even for rare transactions. Otherwise, rare transactions will become frequent as taxpayers discover the tax benefits. Thus, as tax rules become complex, interaction costs increase rapidly and rules quickly become unmanageable. Because standards are less complex, their interaction
costs are lower, which avoids the vicious cycle created by complex
rules.
Another way to articulate the rules/standards problem in the
tax law is to note that rules apply to their complete domain even
if at the borders they are inaccurate. This type of inaccuracy
makes an easy target for tax planning, which both loses revenue
and distorts transactions. To reduce this potential, rules must become more complex, and greater complexity creates additional
opportunities for planning, and onward and onward. Standards
are fuzzy at the borders, reducing this problem.'
" If we have n rules in existence and we add a new rule, the new rule must interact
with all n prior rules. A second new rule would have to interact with n+1 prior rules.
This point is similar to the argument made frequently that rules will be under and
overinclusive relative to their purposes. That a rule may be more complex than a standard, in the sense used here and by Kaplow, yet still be more under and overinclusive
than a standard, indicates that there is more than one notion of complexity being used.
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Thus, the optimal complexity of tax rules is greater than the
optimal complexity of tax standards, and therefore, whether we
use rules or standards affects the content of the law. We must
maximize along both boundaries-whether to use rules or standards and the content of the law-at once. While such a maximization problem is difficult, adding complexity to the analysis
pushes in only one direction, toward more standards. This is not
to say that the tax law necessarily should use a lot of standards.
The frequency analysis suggested by Kaplow still may dictate
many rules. But a more complete analysis will dictate fewer rules
than the frequency analysis standing alone.
C. Consequences of the Discontinuity of Rules: Tax Arbitrage
The second problem with separating the content of the law
from the rules/standards decision-the discontinuity of rules-is
best illustrated by an example. In mixing bowl transactions, the
government faced the problem of distinguishing between essentially identical transactions. On one side, there was the paradigmatic partnership transaction, which was tax free. On the other
side, there was a typical sale or exchange, which was taxable. Between these extremes was a continuous range of transactions,
and the policymaker had to decide which were taxable and which
were not. This type of problem is quite general in the tax law.
The tax law distinguishes between debt and equity, selling and
holding, and independent contractors and employees. There are
hundreds of these types of distinctions. Typically, the tax law
must, on some basis, ,choose between the two extremes rather
than characterize transactions in the middle as part of each.
Suppose we have some notion of where the correct dividing
line is and must decide whether to promulgate the line as a rule
or a standard." No matter how nuanced a rule is, it will create a
bright line between the two types of transactions. Moving one

The notion of complexity used here is the number or detail of distinctions made by the law,
particularly as applied to common sets of facts. The notion used elsewhere in discussions
of rules and standards is the ability to deal with the odd case. It is possible that a rule
might be highly complex but still not deal properly with the odd case while a standard
might be quite simple but readily handle odd cases. Kaplow is correct that in most areas of
the law, focusing on standards' ability to deal with the odd case ignores more important
issues-the daily transactions regulated by law. The argument made in the text is that
rules in the tax law cannot ignore the odd case and, therefore, standards become relatively
more desirable.
" See Weisbach, 84 Cornell L J (forthcoming Sept 1999) (cited in note 12) (discussing
how best to decide where the line should be drawn).
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step to the left will cause a large change in tax consequences. In
this sense, rules are discontinuous. 2
Standards, ex post, have the same discontinuity. A marginal
change to a transaction can change the application of the law.
The courts or administrators who give content to standards have
no greater ability to avoid the line drawing problem than Congress or the regulators who give content to rules. But ex ante, the
taxpayer only knows probabilities. A small change in facts will
only change the probability a little, creating a continuous change
in the law from an ex ante perspective.
A discontinuous law, a cliff, may have very different behavioral effects than a continuous law, although one cannot say
which will be more efficient without more information. For example, if the tax law required assets to remain in the partnership for
two years prior to distribution to avoid disguised sale treatment,
taxpayers who gain more from avoiding sale treatment than they
lose by waiting two years will shift their behavior to use partnerships rather than sales. Those who would have waited two years
anyway have no costs imposed on them. Those who would have
waited a year and six months have the costs of a six month wait
imposed on them, and those who never would have used a partnership at all have the costs of a two year wait. The deadweight
loss is the cost of the wait we impose on these taxpayers (measured relative to the tax revenue raised by this rule).
If instead we impose a standard whose expected value is two
years but the content of which is highly uncertain, each additional day in the partnership produces a tax savings. This means
that everyone has an incentive to leave properties in partnerships
a little longer. Even those who would have waited two years anyway might extend the time. But the benefits of extending the
time come in small, daily increments. Taxpayers will extend the
time property remains in the partnership until the costs exceed
the benefits. The total amount of shifting may be more or less
than in the bright line case, depending on the costs of shifting
and, without more information, we cannot tell which is the case.
More generally, rules will tend to be discontinuous while
standards will not. Where there is a discontinuity, taxpayers sufficiently near the discontinuity will shift to the lower taxed reTechnically, a tax system is continuous with respect to a transaction if, for any
transaction (or position) and any positive number (no matter how small), one can choose a
set of transactions surrounding the transaction such that the tax treatment of each transaction in the range differs from the tax treatment of the original transaction by less than
the chosen number. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual
Framework, 46 Stan L Rev 569, 597-98 n 80 (1994), for a discussion of continuity.
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gime, if transaction costs are less than the tax savings. The
deadweight loss will be the sum of the losses from this shifting.
When the law changes continuously, there is no particular line
that the shifting centers around. All taxpayers potentially benefit
from shifting. Each taxpayer will alter her behavior so that the
expected tax savings just exceed transactions costs. The total
amount of shifting will depend on how rapidly the law changes
relative to the transaction costs of shifting.
There is no reason to expect the deadweight losses in these
cases to be the same. But because the efficiency costs of a rule
with a given content may be different than the costs of a standard
with the same content, the optimal content for a rule may be different than the optimal content for a standard, which means the
content of the law and the rules/standards decision interact.a'
A different sort of behavioral change might cause one to conclude that standards are preferable. Consider a tax system that is
discontinuous. The tax treatment of a transaction changes
abruptly at some point. Taxpayers can achieve a tax arbitrage by
matching a long position very close to that point with a short position exactly at that point. While the pretax net cash flow from
these two positions can be made arbitrarily close to zero, the investor will experience a significant net tax effect.
Taxpayers cannot achieve this type of arbitrage in the mixing
bowl context as there is no simple way to take a short position in
the transaction. But in the financial context, short positions will
exist and arbitrage will be cheap. The classic example of this is
"The effect of discontinuities in the law has been discussed, among other places, in
John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertaintyon Compliance with Legal Standards,70 Va L Rev 965, 974-89 (1984) (discussing uncertainty and the negligence
standard). See also Saul Levmore, ProbabilisticRecoveries, Restitution and Recurring
Wrongs, 19 J Legal Stud 691 (1990).
Tax arbitrage as used here is so-called "pure" tax arbitrage, which involves buying
and selling the same asset in different forms. See Eugene Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 Wayne L Rev 991, 1004-05
(1984). Pare tax arbitrage, as defined by Steuerle, will not change the price of the asset as
the demand is not changed by the activity (it is bought and sold at the same time). If the
two assets used in the arbitrage are different, the arbitrage might change the price of the
assets, capitalizing the tax benefit into the price. This might be efficient, for example, if
Congress enacted a tax preference, the workings of which are dependent on capitalization.
Tax exempt bonds are the classic case, where arbitrage might lower the interest rate on
the bonds by capitalizing the tax benefit into the price, thereby helping municipalities, the
intended beneficiary of the exemption. The arbitrages from discontinuous rules are not
typically incentives enacted by Congress. Instead, they are unintended results and there
isno reason to think that capitalization would be efficient, as it will lead to over or undersupply of the asset. It is possible that the price changes induced will offset some other inefficient price changes caused by taxes or some other regulation so that two wrongs might
be better than one, but absent some evidence of this in a particular situation, we should
not be paralyzed by such second-best considerations.
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the Knetsch case,' in which the taxpayer purchased an annuity
with money borrowed from the same company that sold the annuity.' The borrowing (the short position) produced immediate
interest deductions while the annuity (the long position) had deferred interest inclusions.' Little or no cash changed hands, but
the taxpayer generated significant tax losses.
Tax arbitrage is inefficient. If the forms used in the arbitrage
are perfect substitutes, there is no economic cost to the arbitrage;
the social costs are the transaction costs, which can be large-as
large as the tax avoided. If the forms are not perfect substitutes,
taxpayers change their economic position to obtain a tax advantage, creating inefficiencies similar to the inefficiencies generated
by insufficiently complex tax laws. For example, the taxpayer in
Knetsch might have borne risk in order to show that the transaction was not a complete sham. This increases the return to bearing risk, creating an incentive to take on risk.
The discontinuities created by rules, therefore, have consequences for the content of the law. Rules allow more arbitrages
and, therefore, rulemakers will have to adjust content to take
into account the effect of the arbitrages. At a minimum, if arbitrages lose tax revenue, the tax system will have to raise the
money elsewhere. Aside from arbitrage, the effect of discontinuous laws on taxpayer behavior is ambiguous, but it is likely to
have effects, and content will have to be adjusted accordingly.
This means that we must make the rules/standards decision and
the content decision at the same time. And once again, simultaneous maximization will be complex but, given the problems with
arbitrage, will often push in the direction of standards.
D. A Possible Solution: Anti-Abuse Rules
Arguments for more standards in the tax law are contrary to
the common reaction that we should be certain of our tax liabilities.' I am not sure of the source of this intuition, but it makes
' Knetsch v UnitedStates, 364 US 361 (1960).
3 Id at 362-64 (holding that interest paid on debt was not deductible when
debt was a
sham to decrease tax liability).
' The life insurance company, however, had symmetric treatment of the borrowing
and the annuity because of its ability to claim reserves, which meant that it did not have
income to offset Knetsch's deductions. See IRC §§ 807 (1994) (allowing life insurance companies to claim deductions for reserves), 816 (1994) (defining reserves).
' But see Joseph Stiglitz, The New, New Welfare Economics, in Allen J. Auerbach and
Martin Feldstein, eds, Handbook of Public Economics 1001, 1011-13 (Elsevier Science
1987), for an argument that random taxation may be efficient under certain conditions.
Retroactive taxes may also introduce uncertainty and prevent or limit the problem of uncommon transactions becoming common. A rule-based regime that used retroactive taxes,
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little sense. There is no reason that the tax law should be more
certain than other areas of law. For example, it seems odd to suggest that we should be more certain of our tax liabilities than our
constitutional rights, which is a largely standards-based area of
law, or criminal sanctions, which may depend on the discretion of
the judge.
This is not to say that uncertainty in the tax law is desirable
in its own right. Given the frequency of transactions governed by
tax law, rules are highly desirable. A pure standards-based approach to tax law would not be workable. But the cost of rules is
also too high, as they must be unduly complex. The analysis
leaves us between the Scylla of certain but unduly complex rules
and the Charybdis of uncertain but less complex standards. The
goal of anti-abuse rules is to find a way out.
Anti-abuse rules, as suggested by Surrey thirty years ago (in
the context of court-imposed anti-abuse rules), attempt to allow
the tax law to use simple rules without all of the associated
costs.3 9 They create fuzzy rules. For example, in crafting a tax law
that includes an anti-abuse rule, drafters need not be terribly
concerned with rare transactions that might be mistaxed because
attempts to take advantage of them will be covered by the antiabuse rule. In addition, while not completely solving the line
drawing problem created by discontinuous rules, they reduce arbitrage around the discontinuities. We can then make the decision to use rules or standards or to promulgate the law at a given
level of complexity based on the usual considerations, with less
regard to uncommon transactions or arbitrages created by discontinuities.
The strategy suggested here of obtaining the benefits of rules
without some of the costs can be pursued in a number of different
ways. A common approach is a list of cases covering known situations and a catch-all category for other cases. For example, a
casualty loss is defined as a loss from "fire, storm, shipwreck, or
other casualty."" Another approach is to promulgate a standard
but include examples of the application of the standard to com-

therefore, might be an appropriate solution to the problem. Given Congress's reluctance to
impose retroactive taxes, I will treat this option as unavailable. See Saul Levmore, The
Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J Legal Stud 265, 273-78 (1993) (discussing merits of
retroactive taxation).
Surrey, 34 L & Contemp Probs at 707 n 31 (cited in note 4) (noting that anti-abuse
rules "save the tax system from [ far greater proliferation of detail").
IRC § 165(c)(3) (1994).
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mon situations.4 A third approach is to provide a standard with
safe harbors.4 2
All these approaches attempt to provide some of the certainty
of rules with some of the flexibility of standards to cover unknown situations. Anti-abuse rules have at least two other features that make them unique: they are one-way in favor of the
government and they depend on state of mind. This question of
which approach is best is taken up below, although the fate of
anti-abuse rules in particular is less important than the need to
use strategies that combine the benefits of rules and standards.
H.

ONE-WAY LAWS

Anti-abuse rules allow only the government to depart from
the literal language of the law. If the law provides an inappropriate result for the taxpayer, the taxpayer is stuck. Anti-abuse
rules take a "heads I win, tails you lose" approach. Other approaches to the rules/standards/complexity problem discussed
above, such as lists or standards with examples, do not have this
feature. The question is whether one-way rules are appropriate in
this context, given the alternative methods of solving the problem.
The burden of proof in favor of one-way rules ought to be
high. They create an appearance of unfairness because the govermnent uses different rules than the taxpayer. If a result is inappropriate for the government, one would think it would be inappropriate for the taxpayer.
Nevertheless, one-way rules are common in the tax law. For
example, there are many rules deferring losses (which helps the
government) but taxing gains (which hurts the taxpayer) on the
same type of transaction.4 3 And traditional court-based anti-abuse
principles were always one-way in favor of the government."
4'

The most important recent case of this approach is the rules governing transactions

between members of a consolidated group. See Treas Reg § 1.1502-13.
" For example, for a merger to be tax free, an uncertain portion of the consideration to
the target corporation shareholders must be stock of the acquiring corporation to create
so-called "continuity of interest." See Treas Reg § 1.368-1(b). The appropriate level of stock
consideration is a standard but the IRS has promulgated a safe harbor such that, if 50
percent of the consideration is stock, continuity of interest has been met. Rev Proc 77-37,
1977-2 Cum Bull 568, 569. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal L Rev
953, 960-68 (1995), for a description of other approaches to the rules/standards problem.
, See, for example, IRC § 267 (1994) (sales to related parties), § 1091 (1994) (wash
sales), and § 1092 (1994) (straddles). There are also many rules taxing gains but not
losses. See, for example, the rules for boot in IRC § 351 (contributions to a controlled corporation) and § 1031 (like kind exchanges).

' See Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposalfor Resolving the
Substance-FormDebate, 48 Tax Law 289, 300 (1995) (noting that "'the so called 'two-way
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Anti-abuse rules do not introduce anything new. While this is not
a justification, it indicates that there might be something systemic in the tax law that creates a need for one-way rules.
The best argument for one-way rules is that they produce a
level playing field despite the bias on their face. Think of tax law
promulgation as a game. The government has the first move, in
which it must determine the content of the law. The taxpayer
then determines her transactions. The government has the pen;
the taxpayer has the plan. Given this game, the taxpayer has a
distinct advantage over the government, because the taxpayer
acts with complete knowledge of the government's decisions while
the government can only guess at the taxpayer's decisions. 5 Oneway rules level the playing field by reducing the taxpayer's ability to take advantage of the situation.
For example, capital gains are taxed when realized; the use
of capital losses, however, is severely restricted, creating an apparent one-way rule in favor of the government. But taxpayers
can choose when to recognize gain or loss. Generally they defer
gains while accelerating losses. Data show that, because of the
deferral, gains are taxed at a significantly lower effective rate
than losses." The capital loss restrictions attempt to level the
playing field by deferring losses until gains are realized. Thus an
apparent one-way rule against the taxpayer only levels (in this
case not even levels) the playing field.
In this general form, the "level playing field" argument simply restates the problems with a pure rules-based tax law. If the
government moves first through rules, taxpayers can take advantage of gaps in the rules. Arguably, the same benefit could be
achieved with standards or lists. The government could reduce its
first mover disadvantage by effectively refusing to move first by
using standards (the content of which is determined only after
the taxpayer has acted) or moving first only where it is sure of
the consequences (by using lists, safe harbors, or standards with
examples of clear cases).
The distinct advantage of one-way rules is that they retain
the advantages of rules in all but narrow circumstances. That is,
suppose that, but for the problem with uncommon transactions
street' [of symmetric application of court-created anti-abuse rules] seems to run downhill
for the [IRS] and uphill for the taxpayer").
"I can remember sitting in government offices for hours on end trying to imagine
what the taxpayer response would be to a given set of rules so that we could draft the
rules around the anticipated response.
See Calvin H. Johnson, Deferring Tax Losses With an Expanded § 1211, 48 Tax L
Rev 719, 723 (1993).
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becoming common, we would promulgate the tax law almost exclusively through rules. One-way rules help us do this by enabling us to enter into a bargain in which taxpayers get rules so
long as uncommon transactions stay that way. In normal circumstances, where taxpayers are going about their everyday business, both the government and the taxpayers are bound by the
usual rules. But when a transaction takes advantage of simple
rules and breaks the implicit pact that uncommon transactions
not become common, an anti-abuse rule enforces the bargain.
Whether anti-abuse rules retain the benefits of rules depends
on how well targeted they are, on how well they enforce the bargain. If they apply only in the targeted cases, where the unusual
becomes usual, they may well retain the benefits of rules and reduce the number of uncommon transactions that become common. If, however, they create uncertainty outside their intended
scope, they may have no advantage over other approaches.
One-way laws promulgated as rules inevitably miss their
target to some extent. For example, the capital loss regime applies to all capital losses even if the taxpayer has not selectively
realized losses or has true economic loss. Anti-abuse rules attempt to tailor their focus more narrowly than the capital loss regime. To do so they look at purpose. They apply only when the
transaction is structured with a purpose of avoiding the purposes
of the statute. The question is whether looking at purpose sufficiently narrows the scope of anti-abuse rules so that they are a
better solution to the rules/standards/complexity problem than
other approaches, or whether anti-abuse rules produce such uncertainty and are so frequently misapplied that the costs of using
them are higher than those of other approaches. This is taken up
immediately below.
HI. PURPOSE-BASED TAXATION
Whether anti-abuse provisions should be used in the tax law
comes down to the degree of uncertainty they create. If they are
not more certain than other approaches to solving the rules/
standards/complexity problem, they are undesirable (although
other solutions to the problem, such as more standards in the tax
law, would remain desirable). If they are more certain, they are
desirable.
As noted above, anti-abuse rules focus on two distinct purposes. They typically apply only to transactions entered into with
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a purpose of avoiding the purposes of the statute. 7 The taxpayer's
purpose and the lawmaker's purpose are both relevant.
Before examining the specifics of this approach, one might
object to any taxation based on the taxpayer's state of mind; the
notion of income does not (most often) rely on the taxpayer's
thoughts. One might think it offensive to tax two individuals with
the same Haig-Simons income differently because one of them
has had evil thoughts. 8 Case law generally supports the proposition that state of mind is irrelevant. 9
Nevertheless, fi-om a welfarist perspective, the taxpayer's
state of mind might very well be relevant. For example, ability
taxation, which would depend on innate or unobservable factors
like state of mind, would be more efficient than income taxation
because it would not be avoidable and therefore would not create
adverse incentives. We cannot reject state of mind taxation
merely because definitions of income do not rely on purpose.
The problem with looking to the state of mind is feasibility.
Until we invent a mind reading machine, we cannot accurately
determine state of mind. Instead, we look to external, objective
evidence to guess at state of mind. Whether we should rely on
this evidence to determine taxation is merely a question of the
costs and benefits and of the accuracy of proxies for true state of
mind.
The goal of anti-abuse rules is to identify violations of the
implicit pact that uncommon transactions will not become common in response to simple rules. To identify these transactions,
anti-abuse rules look at both the taxpayer's purpose and the purpose behind the statute. The statute's purpose is relevant because
it allows us to identify which transactions the drafters contemplated in designing the simple rules and which they did not; that
is, which transactions were sufficiently common to be considered
when the law was promulgated. We look to the taxpayer's purpose to determine whether the reason for the transaction is to

See note 1.
The leading article in this tradition is Walter Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purposein
Federal Income Taxation, 34 U Chi L Rev 485 (1967) (arguing against the use of states of
mind in the tax law). See also Gunn, 76 Mich L Rev at 743-58 (cited in note 2) (criticizing
courts distinguishing between taxpayers based on motivation).
See, for example, Superior Oil Co v Mississippi, 280 US 390, 395-96 (1930) (opinion
by Holmes) ("The only purpose of the [taxpayer] was to escape taxation.... The fact that
it desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a
line in the law is that you may intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do not pass
it."). See also Helvering v Gregory, 69 F2d 809, 810 (2d Cir 1934) ("[A] transaction otherwise within the exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated
by a desire to avoid... taxation."), affd, 293 US 465 (1925).
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take advantage of the simple rules. If we applied the anti-abuse
rules to all unusual transactions, the rules would be overbroad,
because unusual transactions may be perfectly legitimate and the
existence of some unusual transactions is to be expected. And if
we applied anti-abuse rules to all transactions planned with
taxes in mind, the rules would be overbroad. The government
may very well draft rules with the intent that there be some taxpayer planning, resulting from some imperfection in the taxation
of common transactions that taxpayers are expected to exploit.
Instead, we must identify uncommon transactions that become
common because of simple rules. We can do so only by looking to
purpose.
Purpose, of course, can only be guessed at through objective
evidence. We might look to see if the transaction is unusual,
whether it offers significant tax benefits, whether it is consistent
with the business (in other words, whether there is a business
purpose), and whether the individual steps in the transaction
make sense. Anti-abuse rules could refer to this type of objective
evidence or directly to the taxpayer's state of mind; it does not
really matter which. Similarly, rather than look to congressional
purpose, we can look to the types of transactions that were common at the time of enactment and the problems or issues that led
to enactment. Again, it does not matter which; we always use
proxies to determine purpose.'
Thus, the goals of purpose-based anti-abuse rules seem plausible. The question is, compared to the level of uncertainty created by anti-abuse rules, what level of uncertainty do other resolutions of the rules/standards/complexity problem create? It is difficult to evaluate the level of uncertainty, as it will vary with the
context. There are many anecdotal stories but no real data. My
own intuition is that most anti-abuse rules do not create significant uncertainty, although the level of uncertainty will vary. I
believe Dan Halperin's claim that tax lawyers are sufficiently
trained and share a sufficiently common understanding of the tax
law to be able to determine which transactions anti-abuse rules
target and which they do not.51 Moreover, the highest uncertainty
"Some have argued that the notion of legislative purpose may be nonsensical. See
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 Harv L Rev 863 (1930). While scholars can debate
this issue, it is not difficult to see that mixing bowl transactions, in their purest form (in
other words, contribution and immediate distribution), are inconsistent with the purpose
of the statute.
" Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?,48 Tax Law 807, 809 (1995) ("I
believe that sophisticated practioners are undoubtedly aware when a transaction is structured to achieve a tax result inconsistent with its economic substance.").
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is reserved for transactions that are most likely to be inefficient.
A transaction entered into without regard for the tax system, for
a true business purpose, is not likely to face any significant uncertainty because of anti-abuse rules. Thus, I conclude that antiabuse rules retain the benefits of rules while reducing the problems created by rules better than other approaches to the issue.
IV.

OTHER COMMENTS

A. When Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?
The discussion above took a blanket approach to anti-abuse
rules and did not consider factors that might bear on individual
cases. Anti-abuse rules will be more appropriate in some cases
than in others. From the discussion above, it is apparent what
factors determine when anti-abuse rules are appropriate.
First, anti-abuse rules are designed to allow simpler rules.
Where complex rules have been enacted, it is not appropriate to
add an anti-abuse rule on top of the complex rules. This is, I believe, the underlying cause of the complaints about the partnership anti-abuse rule, a cause cdl~bre in the tax world for a number
of years. The partnership anti-abuse rule came after repeated
amendments to the partnership statute intended to prevent
transactions such as the mixing bowl transaction.2 It applied in
addition to all of the complex rules and overrode the rules. In this
case we might have the worst of both worlds-unbelievably complex rules and uncertainty. A better approach would have been to
propose the partnership anti-abuse rule in exchange for repeal of
many of the complex rules.'
Second, anti-abuse rules are appropriate only where the
problems of simple rules are serious. In many cases, simple rules
work well, particularly where avoiding the rule requires a real
" For example, the disguised sales rules in IRC §§ 704(cX1)(B), 707(aX2XB), and 737
arguably would not have been needed if an appropriate anti-abuse rule had been enacted
first. An anti-abuse rule on top of the complex statutory rules, however, creates uncertainty without all of the benefits of anti-abuse rules.
Whether a given set of rules is complex or not depends on the economics of the underlying transactions and on the ability of taxpayers to manipulate the rules. For example, the rules governing the taxation of debt instruments (the OID rules) found in sections
1271-75 of the Code are often thought of as complex. If the rules are complex, the OID
anti-abuse rule may not be appropriate, as it creates a layering effect of complexity and
uncertainty. But the OID rules might not be complex relative to the underlying economics,
and rules sufficiently complex to stand on their own may have been significantly more
complex than rules layered with the anti-abuse rule. One cannot merely look at the surface level of detail to determine whether a given set of rules is complex and, therefore, we
cannot conclude that the OD anti-abuse rule is undesirable merely because the regulations appear complex.
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change in behavior rather than just a change in form. For example, the tax law relies on large asset classes to determine appropriate depreciable lives. Simple rules in this case have been very
effective and have not caused problems. The rules for determining when a couple is married are simple-if you are married on
the last day of the year, you are married. These rules, while allowing some manipulation, do not create serious problems. It is
important to find simple compromises like this, and anti-abuse
rules should not get in the way.
Third, the level of uncertainty created by an anti-abuse rule
will vary with the context. For example, some have argued that
the corporate tax rules are without purpose. One can only apply
them as a formal system. If the argument is correct (and I am not
sure that it is), the level of uncertainty created by an anti-abuse
rule would be large, because references to the purposes of the
statute would be highly ambiguous. The benefits in this case may
not outweigh the costs.
Finally, anti-abuse rules should be used only where effective.
If an anti-abuse rule is not likely to prevent taxpayers from taking advantage of insufficiently complex rules, other approaches to
the problem are needed. For example, an approach that relies
less on rules, such as standards with examples, might work better. This brings us to the next topic, which is when anti-abuse
rules are likely to be effective.
B. Efficacy
Anti-abuse rules are not appropriate if they do not adequately enforce the implicit bargain, that is, if they do not prevent taxpayers from taking advantage of simple rules. If antiabuse rules are not effective, they add uncertainty without the
offsetting benefits.
We can view the tax manager of a business as a portfolio
manager. The manager does not care about any particular position. Instead, he wants a diversified portfolio that creates the desired return for the risk. The tax manager's return is the effective
tax rate; the risk is the risk that the true rate, determined after
audit, will be higher than the expected rate. Anti-abuse rules operate by increasing the risk of transactions explicitly designed to
lower effective tax rates (relative to a pure, rules-based regime).
If there are a large number of transactions with a given risk
and return, it will be ineffective to promulgate the law to respond
to any particular transaction, such as a targeted anti-abuse rule.
Managers will simply shift their portfolio to other positions and
maintain their risk/return position, much like stock portfolio
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managers would simply adjust a portfolio if IBM suddenly became significantly riskier. For anti-abuse rules to be effective,
they must apply to a broad set of transactions so as to increase
the risk of aggressive transactions.
This suggests that reading anti-abuse principles into tax
statutes is an appropriate method of implementing anti-abuse
rules. If all tax statutes contained an implicit anti-abuse rule,
risk would be increased for all transactions, preventing tax managers from shifting their portfolios.' The only problem with such
a principle is that, as discussed above, anti-abuse rules can be
more or less appropriate for various circumstances and courts
might be very inaccurate in determining when they should apply.
C.

Other Areas of the Law

Anti-abuse rules, at least in the form they take in the tax
law, appear to be concentrated heavily in the tax area. After some
searching, I found that only the securities law has more than an
isolated anti-abuse rule, and even the securities law has only a
few.' The question is why only the tax law has taken this approach.
The answer seems to be that other areas of law often use a
similar strategy but simply do not use the anti-abuse language of
the tax law. For example, Dan Kahan observes the same approach in the criminal law, which he argues uses "prudent obfuscation of the law's outer boundary" to prevent exactly the type of
problem discussed here."6 Contract law has a duty of good faith,
"This leaves aside issues of separation of powers that often play an important role in
statutory interpretation.
The regulations underlying the federal securities laws contain at least five antiabuse provisions. 17 CFR § 230 Prelim Note 2 to Reg S (1998) (denying Regulation S exemption for foreign transactions to "any transaction or series of transactions that, although in technical compliance with these rules, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the
registration provisions of the [Securities Act of 1933]'); 17 CFR § 230 Prelim Note 6 to Reg
D (1998) (denying Regulation D exemptions in same circumstances); 17 CFR § 230.144A
Prelim Note 3 (1998) (denying Rule 144A exemption for sales to qualified institutional
buyers in same circumstances); 17 CFR § 230.147 Prelim Note 3 (1998) (denying Rule 147
exemption for offers of securities in only one state in same circumstances); 17 CFR
§ 240.12g5-1(b)(3) (1998) (addressing securities held in a form "used primarily to circumvent" the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act). An extensive (but by no
means comprehensive) search of US statutes and regulations revealed only sporadic antiabuse rules in other areas. See 7 CFR § 718.201(d) (1998) (denying approval to farm reconstitutions that otherwise meet regulatory criteria if the primary purpose of the reconstitution is to circumvent agriculture regulations); 19 CFR § 10.304(b) (1998) (denying
preferential "originating goods" status under US-Canada Free Trade Agreement to goods
"having undergone any process or work in which ... the sole object was to circumvent the
provisions of [the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement]").
Kahan, 96 Mich L Rev at 139 (cited in note 24).
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which can override the literal language of the contract.57 And
state traffic laws may require reasonable or cautious driving even
if the driver complies with the explicit rules.' The interaction of
the content of the law with the promulgation of the law as a rule
or a standard appears to be a relatively common phenomenon.
One might ask, if the problem is common, why has the tax
law had to address it more explicitly than other areas of law. It
may be that the problem of uncommon transactions becoming
common is worse in the tax law than in other areas. The tax law
relies on form more than most areas of the law, and one can easfly manipulate form without changing the economics of a transaction. In addition, taxpayers often feel entitled to structure transactions to avoid taxes, 9 an entitlement that has its origins in a
long and distinguished line of case law. This type of entitlement
may encourage taxpayers to push the boundaries, requiring a
more explicit response in the tax area than in other areas.
D. Public Choice Elements
The discussion above treats the decision to impose an antiabuse rule as one made by a decisionmaker attempting to maximize welfare. Actual lawmakers often have other incentives. The
prevalence of anti-abuse rules may reflect some of their incentives as well as welfare maximization. In particular, anti-abuse
rules shift power to government policymakers by retaining discretion in the application of the law. A countervailing incentive,
however, is to promulgate complex rules, as regulators often
leave the government and become practicing lawyers. Complex
rules create a demand for the drafter's legal advice as the drafter
is likely to have a better knowledge of the law than others. Given
these incentives, there is no reason to believe that the government will promulgate the law in the optimal form, but it is difficult to make a prediction which way the bias goes.

While there is a long line of cases in the tax law implementing anti-abuse principles,
there are as many cases insisting on literal interpretation of the Code. See note 25.
For example, in addition to specific speed limits, Illinois law provides:
No vehicle may be driven upon any highway of this State at a speed which is
greater than is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the use
of the highway, or endangers the safety of any person or property. The fact that
the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does
not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when ... special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway
conditions.

ILCS ch 625, § 5/11-601(a) (Michie 1993).
" See note 25.
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E. Norms
I would be remiss in a Symposium at The University of Chicago Law School in the 1990s not to mention norms. One may
view anti-abuse rules as an attempt to change the norms among
taxpayers. As noted above, much case law gives credence to the
idea that we should encourage planning bizarre transactions
solely to minimize taxes. In an attempt to change norms among
taxpayers, anti-abuse rules may simply express the contrary
view, that such planning is unacceptable. Learned Hand and
other judicial promoters of tax shelters were wrong. Tax motivated transactions are inefficient and, by lowering tax receipts,
they impose an externality on everyone else in the form of higher
tax rates. Norms that such transactions are unacceptable might
reduce their prevalence.
CONCLUSION
While anti-abuse rules are, for now, a tax law phenomenon,
they point to an important problem in the rules/standards decision that may occur in other areas of the law: the level of complexity and the decision to use a rule or a standard interact.
Rules must be promulgated in advance and, therefore, have to
cover all possible transactions. If misregulating uncommon
transactions creates high costs, as in the tax law, rules must be
more complex than standards. This makes the choice between the
two more complicated. At a minimum, literature on the
rules/standards distinction should make clear the assumptions
concerning the connection between rules, standards, and complexity. Within the tax law, mistaxing uncommon transactions often creates serious problems, yet given the frequency of application, rules are needed. Anti-abuse rules, by creating "fuzzy rules,"
attempt to solve this problem.

